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INDEPENDENCE AXIOM, AND NONLINEAR
UTILITY THEORY*
JERRY GREEN
An individual with known preferences over lotteries can be led to accept random
wealth distributions different from his initial endowment by a sequential process in
which some uncertainty is resolved and he is offered a new lottery in place of the
remaining uncertainty. This paper examines the restrictions that can be placed on an
individual's preferences by axioms that stipulate that such a process not be able to
generate a new wealth distribution that is prima facie inferior to the original. The
relationship of these axioms to the independence axiom of von Neumann and
Morgenstern and to the quasi convexity of preferences in the wealth distribution are
explored.
I. INTRODUCTION
Expected utility theory is the cornerstone of most of the
modern economic analysis of behavior in the presence of risk. It is
based on three assumptions about preference over distributions of
payoffs. First, preferences are described by a complete preorder
over the space of distributions. Second, this ordering is continuous
in an appropriate sense. Third, the ordering satisfies an indepen-
dence condition: if the individual is indifferent between distribu-
tions F and G, then he is indifferent between aF + (1 — a)H and
aG -I- (1 — a)H for all probabilities a and all distributions H.
The independence condition is necessary for the representabil-
ity of preferences by a linear functional over the space of all
probability distributions. This linearity has been extremely useful
as an analytical tool. The behavior of an individual with a linear
preference functional over distributions has many attractive prop-
erties. His choices will be dynamically consistent when beliefs are
updated using Bayes's Rule. Moreover, a knowledge of his prefer-
ences for small gambles, that is, for low probability deviations from
his current situation, is sufficient to determine his preference
globally.
Ever since it was first proposed as an axiom, the independence
hypothesis has been under attack. Criticism has been based on
theoretical and empirical grounds. Examples of reasonable behav-
*This research was supported by a grant from the National Science Foundation.
The author wishes to thank Eddie Dekel and Andreu Mas-Colell for many discus-
sions on this topic.
© 1987 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology,
The Quarterly Joumai of Economics, November 1987786 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
iors that are incompatible with independence have been given. The
consequences of independence have been viewed by some as coun-
terintuitive, if not actually self-contradictory. Furthermore, in
experimental tests of ever improving design, the independence
hypothesis has been repeatedly refuted. An important theoretical
task, therefore, is the development of alternative hypotheses that
place some testable constraints on behavior, less restrictive than
those entailed by independence.
Recently, Machina [1982] has shown that the principal results
of expected utility theory survive the relaxation of the indepen-
dence axiom. Using only the first two axioms, he demonstrates that
many of the observed violations of the independence axiom can be
accommodated, while at the same time retaining the features of
behavior most commonly assumed in economic analysis. For exam-
ple, the monotonicity of preferences with respect to the relation of
stochastic dominance of distributions has a straightforward inter-
pretation in the absence of the independence axiom. Likewise, the
idea of risk aversion and increasing absolute risk aversion, which
are usually formulated in terms of the von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility function, can equally well be recast in the more general
framework. They can stand on their own in the absence of the
independence hypothesis.
The goal of this paper is to develop qualitative restrictions on
the nature of the nonlinear preference functional from new behav-
ioral hypotheses. The origin of these hypotheses lies in an early but
incorrect defense of expected utility theory, widely quoted but
apparently never actually put forth in written form (see Machina
[1983], p. 92 or Samuelson [1983], pp. 517-18). The statement is
that, in the absence of the independence condition, an individual
could be induced to "make book against himself."^
A formal description of the hypotheses concerning the absence
of any possibility that an individual can be induced to make book
against himself will be given in the next section. Here, by way of
introduction, we give a less than precise account. We hypothesize
the existence of an outside agent who knows the preferences of the
1. There is a literature on the related hypothesis of "No Dutch Book," in the
theory of subject probability and Bayesian updating rules. It says that, if a
risk-neutral individual does not behave according to an additive probability distri-
bution which he updates as a Bayesian, it would be possible to lead him into gambles
with a negative expected payoff, or even into gambles which have nonpositive
payoffs with probability one. See Freedman and Purves [1969] or deFinetti [1974],
Chapter 3. Related work, in the nature of restricting preferences rather than
updating rules, is the paper by Yaari [1985]."MAKING BOOK AGAINST ONESELF" 787
individual and who can do two things. He can formulate the risks
facing the individual as a compound lottery, to be resolved in stages
in a way that the individual can observe. And the agent can offer to
exchange whatever risk the individual is facing, at an intermediate
stage of the compound lottery, for something he prefers.
Thus, the outside agent leads the individual from the random
variable upon which he initially has a claim to some other random
variable. In the process the outsider must absorb the difference
between them. If this difference were a positive random variable,
outsiders would flourish. And agents with preferences such as this
would lose money—or "make book against themselves." Even if this
difference were not positive, the distribution effectively received by
the agent, taking into account the effects of the manipulation,
might be stochastically dominated by that of the original random
variable to which he had a claim. The outsider would receive a
nonnegative amount of money, and if he could repeat this proce-
dure with many agents, he would profit handsomely. Although the
agent would have been led to accept the manipulation in accordance
with his own preferences, he would retrospectively regret it. If
preferences were learned, then preferences such as these would be
discouraged, and presumably would eventually disappear.
The axioms that I propose take two forms. The first says that
these manipulations should never lead the agent to an alternative
that is (first-order) stochastically dominated by his initial prospect.
The second form of this axiom says that the outsider should not be
able to profit from this manipulation, either by obtaining a positive
random payoff, or one with a positive mean.
The conclusions of this paper can be summarized as follows. If
the individual has nonlinear preferences and if the realizations of
the initial random variable can be observed by the outsider, there
will always exist some initial random variable such that the outsider
can extract a nonnegative amount of money from the agent with
probability one and a strictly positive amount of money with some
probability. In this sense the individual would have "made book
against himself." And it is in this sense that the defense of expected
utility theory on these grounds is valid. The observability of the
realization of initial random wealth is an important, unstated,
aspect of the argument. If manipulative activity cannot be based on
the realization of initial wealth, the outsider never can make money
in this sense.
Stronger results are proved in the case of nonstochastic initial
wealth. Linearity can be weakened to quasi convexity. Whenever788 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
the preferences fail to be quasi-convex, there will exist some initial
situation w such that the individual can be led from u; to a random
variable y whose distribution is stochastically dominated by w.
Conversely, for any quasi-convex preference relation and any initial
w, no manipulation exists that leads the agent to a stochastically
dominated alternative. Note that a quasi-convex but nonlinear
preference relation can be manipulated from some initial random
wealth but not from any nonrandom wealth. Thus, such prefer-
ences cannot be dismissed on the grounds sketched above, unless
there is reason to think that the particular initial random wealths
from which detrimental manipulations can be made are actually
present. In summary, this paper presents a strong argument for
quasi convexity of preference and only a qualified bolstering of the
argument for linearity.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section II I present the
preliminaries that will permit a discussion of lotteries whose out-
comes are realized through a sequential procedure. Section III
covers the concept of the manipulation of lotteries—the method by
which individuals can effectively be led to accept payoff distribu-
tions that they would have rejected had they been offered as direct
replacements for their initial wealth. Section IV presents the
equivalence of independence for the nonmanipulability condition
mentioned above, when correlated lotteries are allowed, and, for the
case of nonstochastic initial wealth, the equivalence of the nonma-
nipulability condition with the quasi convexity of the preference
functional. A concluding set of comments is given in Section V.
II. LOTTERIES
A tree {N,<) is a finite set N and a partial ordering < over the
points of N, having two properties: < has a least element, no, called
the root ofthe tree, and, for each n E. N,< completely orders {n' G
N\n' < n}. The points of Nare called nodes. If rii < ^2, then Wj is said
to be a predecessor of ^2, and ^2 is said to be a successor of MI.
If Hi < ^2 and there is no n3 such that nj < ^3 < ra2. then n^ and
^2 are said to be the immediate predecessor and immediate succes-
sor of each other. A node with no successors is said to be a terminal
node. The set of all terminal nodes in a tree is denoted T. A payoff
function z:T—• fl is any real valued function on the terminal nodes
of the tree. Its values indicate the amount of money received by the
player if that terminal node is reached."MAKING BOOK AGAINST ONESELF" 789
Each pair (^11,^2) of two nodes consisting of an immediate
predecessor and successor of each other is called a step in the tree.
The set of all steps in a tree is denoted S. A transition rule p:S —•
[0,1] is a function specifying the conditional probability of taking
each of the possible steps (n^, n^) having reached rii. Thus, for each
Ml ^T, p satisfies Sp(rei,n2) = 1, where the sum is taken over all
immediate successors n2 of rij. A transition rule induces a probabil-
ity distribution over terminal nodes in the obvious way.
An extensive lottery L = {N,<,z,p) consists of a tree, (N,<), a
payoff function 2, and a transition rule p. To every extensive lottery
L we can associate its payoff distribution Fi, induced by the
distribution over terminal nodes and the payoffs associated with
these nodes.
A subtree (N',<') of {N,<) is a subset N' of N consisting of a
node n and all its successors, together with the restriction <' of < to
N'.
A sublottery L{n) = {N',<',z',p') of (N,<,z,p) is the subtree
(N',<') with root n, the restriction 2' of the payoff function 2 to the
terminal nodes in (N',<'), and the restriction p' of the transition
rule p to the steps in {N',<'). Special attention will be devoted to
the sublotteries L{n), where n is an immediate successor of n^,,
the root of (N,<). These sublotteries will be termed immediate
sublotteries.
III. PREFERENCES AND MANIPULATIONS
In this section we describe the methods through which an agent
can be manipulated, dynamically, by an outsider who knows his
preferences, his initial situation, and who has the ability to
construct certain alternatives that can be offered to the agent. First,
we shall discuss the manipulation of an agent whose situation is
described by the claim to a lottery L. Then we shall treat the case in
which the agent's initial wealth is described by a random variable x.
The concept of manipulation will be different according to whether
or not the outsider can or cannot use the realization of x to
condition his offers to the agent.
Let Dil) be the set of all probability distributions F with
support on a compact interval /. The points of / represent possible
payoffs in lotteries. Distributions concentrated on single points
w E: I are denoted G^.
Let V(-) be a numerical representation of the agent's prefer-
ence relation on D{I). This representation exists under quite790 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
general assumptions. We assume that V(.-) is continuous and
strictly increasing with respect to the partial ordering of first-order
stochastic dominance. For every F G D{I), there is a point c(F) £ /
such that V(Gc(f)) = V(F). The point c(.F) is termed the certainty
equivalent of F.
Agents' preferences over lotteries are given by their prefer-
ences over the induced distributions. Letting W(L) = V{FL), W{-)
serves as a numerical representation of this preference.
Similarly, if the agent's random wealth is described by a
random variable x, the induced distribution of x will be denoted F^
and the numerical representation of preferences over random
variables will be defined hy U{x) = V(FJ.
Consider a lottery L, and let the set of all immediate successors
of its root, no, be denoted S^. Note that
Suppose that for each n G S^,, !/„ is a lottery such that W(Ln) £
W(L{n)). We could resolve the initial uncertainty in the lottery L,
obtaining n with probability p(no,n), and then offer to substitute Ln
for the sublottery, L{n), that would have remained at that point.
Such replacements would all be accepted by an individual whose
preferences are described by W. This individual would effectively
have obtained a distribution.
instead of Fi.
When V(-) is nonlinear, it can be the case that V{F') < V(Fi),
even though ViF^^) £ ViF^n)) for all n G Si. This fact motivates
the basic definitions of this paper, which allow us to make precise
the method by which such reversals of preference can be induced.
A simple (or one-stage) manipulation of a lottery L is a
function MiL;-) defined on the immediate successors ofthe root of
L, and taking values in the space of all lotteries. The lottery
M{L;ni) replaces the sublottery L(rai) whenever n^ is reached. Thus,
the simple manipulation M{L;-) changes the lottery L into a lottery
in which the payoff distribution is Ss^ p(no>'^i)^M(L;n,)-
A two-stage manipulation ofL consists of a one-stage manipu-
lation Mi(L;-) and, for each MI G S/,, a one-stage manipulation of
Afi(L;ni), denoted M2(Mi(L;ni),0."MAKING BOOK AGAINST ONESELF" 791
We can proceed by compounding manipulations in this fashion
for as many stages as desired. A (compound) manipulation C of L
consists of a collection of 1-stage manipulations:
M2(Mi(L;ni);-) for each ^i G S^,
M3(M2(Mi(L;ni);n2);-) for each ni G SL, and M2 £ S
etc.
A simple manipulation of L, M{L-,-) is acceptable to an
individual with utility IV(-) if for each n ^ Si,
W{M{L;n)) a WiL{n)).
A compound manipulation C is acceptable if each of the simple
manipulations of which it is composed is acceptable.
Manipulations of lotteries alter the distribution of payoffs that
the individual is actually receiving, when viewed from the root of
the original lottery. We denote the distribution induced by a
manipulation C hy Fc-
An initial lottery F can be manipulated into any lottery F^
where C is an acceptable manipulation of F. The set of all such F^
includes, of course, all F' for which V{G) a ViF). Whenever V is
nonlinear, it will be much larger, and will not even define a
transitive ordering over distributions. Our hypothesis, however, will
be that the set of all such F^ should not include any distribution that
F stochastically dominates.
We now consider an individual whose initial situation is
described by a real-valued random variable x. A manipulation of x
will be defined to consist of a substitution of a lottery L instead of x
and a further manipulation of the lottery L. Let us denote a
manipulation of x by the pair {L,C), where C is a compound
manipulation ofL. A manipulation {L,C) is acceptable if WiX) a
U{x) and if C is an acceptable manipulation ofL.
The outcome of a manipulation of {L,C) is a random payoff y
whose distribution will be written as F^ic). This distribution deter-
mines the effective outcome attained by the agent. That is to say,
the agent's welfare depends only upon F(ic). On the other hand, the
effect of having undertaken this manipulation on the net wealth of
the outside agent who has made these manipulative offers and
exchanges may depend on joint distribution of the random payoff
finally received by the agent, y, and on the agent's original payoff, x,
which he has given up in exchange for L. Whether or not it is in the792 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
interest of the outsider to undertake the manipulation {L,C) of x
will depend on both his preferences and on this joint distribution.
The lottery L can be correlated with x in the sense that the
outcomes of x are associated with terminal nodes t of L according to
a function x{t) which induces the random variahle x. The interpre-
tation of this is that the outside manipulator offers to pay z{t) at
terminal node t, hut retains the right to the outcome x{t) that the
agent forgoes. Thus, the outside manipulator receives the random
variahle x(t) — z(t) if the initial manipulation of x is accepted.
Superimposing the compound manipulation C on L, the outside
manipulator's payoff is altered further. Because of his ahility to
ohserve the outcome of x, the manipulator can receive any random
variahle x - y, where y is the outcome of the compound manipula-
tion and X is the initial wealth, with the correlation hetween x and y
controlled by the manipulator. If the outcome of x were not
ohservahle, the manipulator could only achieve those y for which x
and 2 were independent.
IV. RESULTS
This paper attempts to limit the family of preferences that the
agent might display hy imposing, as a behavioral hypothesis, the
conditions that he cannot he adversely manipulated or that the
outside manipulator cannot henefit by doing so. The agent will
surely he hurt hy a manipulation if he can he led to accept a random
variahle whose distrihution is stochastically dominated hy that of
his initial wealth. For any particular functional, some manipula-
tions may actually make him worse off, even though they lead to
distributions that are not dominated. But such transformations will
not he beneficial to the manipulative outsider. Whether or not a
given transformation is beneficial to the outsider depends upon
whether we require that he be made better off with prohahility one,
or merely that he reach a stochastically dominating distrihution.
For if the initial x stochastically dominates the result y, the
outsider's payoff x - y will have positive variance as well as positive
mean. Therefore, to insure that the outsider profits at the expense
of the agent, we might require that x — yhe a nonnegative random
variahle with positive mean. The weaker concept of stochastic
dominance is relevant if the outsider is risk neutral, or if he can
independently perform the indicated manipulation on many
agents.
These remarks motivate the following results.^
2. A theorem very much like Theorem 2 below is stated in Yaari [1985]."MAKING BOOK AGAINST ONESELF" 793
THEOREM 1. If V satisfies the independence axiom, then for all x
and all manipulations {L,C), the distribution F(ic) does not
stochastically dominate F^. A fortiori, x — y cannot be a
nonnegative random variable with positive mean.
Proof. Under the expected utility hypothesis the individual
will be dynamically consistent. Therefore, U{y) a U{x). The result
is thus an obvious consequence of the monotonicity of V with
respect to first-order stochastic dominance. ||
THEOREM 2. If V fails to satisfy the independence axiom, and if the
outsider can observe the outcome of x, then there exists an
initial x and a manipulation {L,C) that induces a random
variable y such that x — y is nonnegative and has a positive
mean. A fortiori, F^ is stochastically dominated by F(t,c)-
Proof. The proof is a direct consequence of the independence
axiom and the fact that the steps in L can be perfectly correlated
with the outcomes of x. When independence fails, we can find
distributions F, G, and H and a probability a such that V{F) =
V{G) and V(aF + (1 - a)H) < V(aG + (1 - a)H). Let x he any
random variable on an atomless measure space Q having the
distribution aF + (1 - a)H. Without loss of generality, using a
continuity argument, we can suppose that x takes only finitely
many values. Let Qp and Q^ form a partition of fl having probability
a and 1 — a and such that the conditional distributions of x given Qp
and QH are F and H, respectively. The existence of such a partition
follows from the fact that fl is atomless.
Define the lottery L as follows. There are two immediate
successors of the root of L, denoted np and n^. The steps to np and
n,j are taken in the events Qp and Qjj, respectively. Following np and
njf, there are as many immediate successors as there are possible
values of x. The transition rule of L specifies that these steps are
taken in precisely the events on which x, conditional on Up or Q/j,
takes the corresponding values. These nodes are all terminal, and
the payoff function specifies the corresponding value of x at each
node. Clearly L is just a two-stage way of realizing the same random
variable x, and thus V{L) = Uix).
Now manipulate L as follows: at np, substitute a lottery Lg
instead of the sublottery L(np). The lottery Lg consists of a root and
a set of immediate successors of this root, each identified with a
possible value ofthe distribution G, which, without loss of generali-
ty, is presumed to have finite support. The payoff and transition
rule in LQ are such that G is the distribution of LQ. At nu, no change
is made. Let us call the resulting lottery L'.794 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
Viewed from the root of L, this one-stage manipulation is
acceptable because V(aF + (1 - a)H) = W{L) < W{L^) =
ViaG -I- (1 - a)H). Indeed, a positive amount can be subtracted at
every realization of L^ without affecting this acceptability.
Finally, we manipulate L' by substituting, at np, a lottery
precisely equal to the sublottery L(np), which was taken away at the
previous stage. Because ViF) = V(G), this is acceptable. And if a
positive amount were subtracted from the payoffs in La, then it is
strictly preferred. ||
This two-stage manipulation of L has led to a lottery that is
strictly dominated, for every w G Q, by x. It is the ability of the
outsider to construct lotteries whose outcomes are determined by
events in fi that is responsible for this pointwise dominfuice of the
resulting random variables.
We now come to the main results of this paper. Here, the
outside manipulator's inability to observe x is not important
because the initial wealth of the consumer is assumed to be
nonstochastic. In these circumstances, the linearity of V(-)
required to insure nonmanipulability can be weakened to quasi
convexity. Theorem 3 shows that quasi convexity is sufficient, and
Theorem 4 shows that it is necessary.
THEOREM 3. Let V(-) be quasi-convex, and let C be an acceptable
manipulation of G^ for some nonstochastic w E: I- Then G^
does not stochastically dominate Fc.
Proof. Let L be any lottery with a payoff function whose value
is identically w. Let C consist of the simple manipulations,
Mi(L;-),M2(Mi(L;«i);-), • • • Since C is acceptable and since prefer-
ences are quasi convex, at least one ofthe sublotteries Mi(L,ni)(n2)
must be preferred to L. Similarly, at least one of M2(Mi(L;ni);
(n2)(n3) must be preferred to Mi(L;nx)(n2) and hence better than L.
As this process terminates, one of the sublotteries at the last stage
MkiMk-ii... (Mi(L;«i); inz);... ,)imk) must be preferred to L.
Because V is monotone in stochastic dominance, this sublottery
must entail a positive probability of obtaining an outcome greater
than w. As this sublottery is realized with positive probability, Fc,
which is a mixture of it with other distributions, cannot be domi-
nated by G^. I
THEOREM 4. Let Vi-) fail to be quasi-convex. Then there exists
w Ei I and an acceptable manipulation C of G^, such that Fc is
stochastically dominated by G^.
Proof. The theorem will be proved by exhibiting a manipula-
tion with the desired property."MAKING BOOK AGAINST ONESELF" 795
If V( •) is not quasi-convex, then there exists F, F^, F', and a G
(0,1) such that F = aF^ + il - a)F'- and ViF') < ViF) for i - 1,2.
By the continuity of Vi-) we can take F, F^, and F'^ to have finite
support, without loss of generality.
Let w = ciF). In the first step of the manipulation of G^, we
replace it by a lottery L with two immediate successors n^ and n2 of
its initial node, and such that Fi = F, F^jn,, = F^, and Fn^ = Fl This
can obviously be done by a lottery having all the successors of ni and
^2 be the terminal nodes, and with the probabilities of n^ and ^2
equal to a and (1 - a), respectively.
Let MiL;ni) he a lottery whose induced distribution is concen-
trated on the certainty equivalent ciF') of the distribution F'. By
hypothesis, MiL; •) is an acceptable manipulation of L. Hence the
compound manipulation of G^ is acceptable and results in a
two-point distribution, with probabilities a and 1 - a of ciF^) and
^), respectively.il
V. CONCLUDING COMMENTS
This paper has demonstrated the connection between the
linearity of the preference functional, its quasi concavity, and
related notions of the inconsistency of choice. We have seen that an
individual whose initial wealth is nonstochastic and whose prefer-
ence functional is quasi-convex cannot be manipulated to accept a
reuidom variable whose value is surely below this wealth level.
Conversely, if it is known that for every nonstochastic initial wealth
level there is no acceptable dynamic manipulation leading to a
dominated result, then the individual must have a quasi-convex
preference functional.
When the possible initial situations include stochastic as well
as nonstochastic wealth, the corresponding results are stronger: any
nonlinear preference can be manipulated from some initial stochas-
tic wealth situation; and no linear preference can ever be manipu-
lated. Moreover, if the realization of the initial stochastic wealth is
an observable event upon which manipulations can be made contin-
gent, then the result of a manipulation can lead to a reduction in
payoff with probability one. If it is not observable, the result can be
a distribution dominated in the sense of first-order stochastic
dominance, rather than pointwise.
I believe that these results clarify the extent to which argu-
ments about "making book against oneself" can be used to
constrain the form of nonlinear utility functionals. The principal
conclusion that preferences should be quasi-convex is another796 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
independent argument for quasi convexity, bolstering those based
on temporal risks (see Kreps and Porteus [1978] and Machina
[1984] and those based on the ability of agents themselves to
randomize their choices, and hence obtain any convex combination
from among those offered to them.
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